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On Feminist Legal Methodologies: Spilt, Plural and Speaking Subjects 
Gina Heathcote* 
Abstract 
This article uses Nicola Lacey’s 1998 book Unspeakable Subjects as a prompt to consider the 
potential of feminist jurisprudence to develop methodologies that focus on the foundational 
dimensions of law. I therefore explore possibilities for a feminist account of legal subjectivity 
that uses Lacey’s account of critique, utopias and reform to articulate three interlocking 
feminist methodologies which I label split subjectivities, plural subjectivities and political 
responsible listening. I argue that these feminist methodologies draw in understandings of 
difference and of the centrality of inter-subject relations as the important dimensions of 
humanness that accounts of autonomy overlook before challenging the text to further 
consider which voices, and knowledge practices, remain silenced by feminist legal 
methodologies. To realise these ideas in strategies for law reform I argue for feminist 
listening that exercises care through the centring of accounts that emerge from those whose 
normative universe is more often particularised and discounted in law. As such, the article 
addresses legal subjectivity through the lens of intersectionality but with a jurisprudence that 
seeks to transcends the constraints of identity politics and through attention to indigenous 
Australian feminisms. 
Keywords feminist legal methodology, intersectionality, Unspeakable Subjects, legal 
subjectivity, feminist jurisprudence; indigenous knowledge practices  
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Should feminism aspire to replace or reconstruct the framework of modern legal 
thought, or should it resist the desire for foundations in favour of a more resolutely 
critical stances?1 
I. 
Introduction  
                                                 
* Reader in Gender Studies and International Law, Centre for Gender Studies and School of Law, SOAS 
University of London. I acknowledge the Boonwurrung people of the Kulin Nation as the traditional owners of 
the land on which I was born, on which I grew into adulthood. and where I concluded the writing of this article. 
I acknowledge that their land was stolen, and that sovereignty was never ceded. I pay my respects to their elders 
past and present. I also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers’ responses and for their generous reading of my 
ideas; to give especial thanks to Arlie as my editor, co-editor, co-conspirator and long-time friend; and to Nicola 
Lacey for books worth re-reading alongisde inspirational conversations and teaching that have left important 
traces across my academic career and were formative in my development of a feminist consciousness.  
1 Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: feminist essays in legal and social theory (Hart 1998) 167 
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This article functions simultaneously as a celebration of Lacey’s contribution to feminist 
jurisprudence, a quest for a return and revisiting the central themes in Unspeakable Subjects, 
and a conscious pondering of how to shift beyond the placement of the sex/gender as the 
central axis within feminist legal theories. To undertake these functions the article unfolds in 
the following manner. In section two I introduce three different approaches to legal 
subjectivity: split subjectivity, plural subjects and the politics of listening. Each approach 
seeks to actively incorporate contemporary understandings of sex and gender as intersectional 
and thus requiring engagement with (at the very least) race, sexuality, ablebodiness and class 
within feminist legal methodologies. 2 In this sense, I recognise Lacey’s call for a feminist 
jurisprudence mindful of adjunct critical legal approaches and expand this to include adjunct 
critical feminist projects.3 In section two , the first part approaches legal subjectivity through 
the motif of split subjects, acknowledging the interconnections and separations that human 
actors encounter in their lifetimes and which, I argue, better describes and accounts for legal 
subjects. The second part and approach centres on the possibility of a legal theory that 
encounters and understands legal subjectivity through the lens of plural subjectivity. I draw 
on different feminist theories to consider why plural subjectivity is an important feminist 
ethic, so as to consider a means to understand how difference can be theorised, and, 
importantly, produce different legal outcomes. The third approach considers the flaws of a 
feminist theory of split and plural subjects that fails to account for both historical and 
continuing material harms. I argue that this disrupts the fantasy of a feminist legal subject4 to 
recognise the legacy and relevance of both critical race feminism and black British feminism 
for contemporary gender studies.  Recognising that gender law reforms often reaffirm a 
gendered legal subject, as well as the intersectional harms she experiences, I add Otto’s 
politics of listening as a feminist methodology to engage and actively transform, not only 
who speaks but how feminists need to learn to listen, often uncomfortably. I draw in 
indigenous Australian knowledge as an example of the types of listening feminists might 
commence to re-orientate legal knowledge.  
The closing section of the paper draws these methodological reflections back into 
conversation with Lacey’s work on Unspeakable Subjects, recognising limitations as well as 
applications of the approaches discussed. I frame the structure of the article through Lacey’s 
assertion: 
Only if both the distinctiveness of and the interrelationships between the projects of 
critique, utopianism and reformism are recognised will intellectual practices – feminist, 
                                                 
2 The origins of the term intersectionality are drawn from the seminal writing of Kimberlé Crenshaw, and the 
longer history of critical race feminism in the US, see further: Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence against Women of Colour’ (1991) 43(6) Stanford Law Review 
124; as well as the rich history of scholarship on intersectionality written by Black British feminists, see further: 
Avtar Brah and Ann Phoenix, ‘Ain’t I a Woman? Revisiting Intersectionality’ (2004) 5(3) Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 75; Gail Lewis, ‘Questions of Presence’ (2017) 117 Feminist Review 1 
3 NB: I use critical feminist here to refer to a broad range of feminist theories that draw in other forms of critical 
projects and methodologies including affect theories, cultural studies, postmodernism, postcolonialism, critical 
race studies, diaspora studies, queer studies, trans studies and decolonial studies, this is not to be confused with 
the use of the term ‘gender critical feminisms’ which has been used to denote anti-trans feminists through the 
preoccupation with the creation of women-only spaces that are often exclusionary and harmful to trans women 
and gender queer individuals approaching sex/gender in a reductive fashion that is not in line with the approach 
of this article.  
4 This is a paraphrasing of Joan Scott, see: Joan Wallach Scott, The Fantasy of Feminist History (Duke 
University Press 2011) 
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socio-legal or otherwise – move any closer to the ethical ideals which, implicitly or 
explicitly, they espouse.5 
If contemporary feminist and gender theories espouse a commitment to intersectionality as 
the ethical link across strands and approaches, below I explore how this might shape critique 
of legal subjects, images of alternatives – a form of utopianism -, and a need for a practical 
agenda around reform. However, mindful of the twenty years since the publication of 
Unspeakable Subjects it seems necessary to at once acknowledge the legal reforms based on 
gender that have occurred in the past two decades and the continued status quo of a system 
that knits in gendered disadvantages and harms. As such, this article examines how feminist 
legal theories might approach the interlocking of critique-utopias-reform with new insight.6 
To this end I close the article with a discussion of indigenous Australian accounts of 
personhood, inspired by the work of artist Charmaine Pwerle, who threads together 
knowledge of the landscape, women’s relationships and the intergenerational and relational 
aspects of community in her art (see Figure 1). I regard indigenous feminisms as asking 
different questions of feminist jurisprudence promoting an examination of the deep-set 
knowledge processes that inform Western feminist legal theories.7 In doing so I wish to 
contemplate new shapes for feminist critique, unearthing the contours of utopias imagined in 
feminist writing to prepare for legal reform that challenges feminist thinking as equally as it 
challenges standard legal tropes.  
 
 
Figure 1: Charmaine Pwerle, My Grandmother’s Country 7B 
Amongst Charmaine Pwerle’s art My Grandmother’s Country 7B invokes indigenous 
knowledge and relationships to community, law and land beautifully. 8  The painting presents 
interlocking, sweeping lines, colour and movement that recall the paintings of Pwerle’s 
mother and grandmother.9 That this is her grandmother’s country reminds me of the arrival of 
                                                 
5 Lacey (n 1) 248 
6 Lacey (n 1) 236; also see: Gina Heathcote, ‘Critique as Activism as Critique’ (2018) 18 A Collection of 
Writings on Honour of Professor Dianne Otto, Melbourne Journal of International Law 131 
7 See further: Various Authors, ‘Legalising the Soul: Native Title Rights and Colonisation’ (1998) 11 Australian 
Feminist Law Journal; Irene Watson, ‘Indigenous People’s Law-Ways: Survival against the Colonial State’ 
(1997) 8 Australian Feminist Law Journal 39 
8 Charmaine Pwerle, My Grandmother’s Country (7B) Acrylic on Linen (born 1975) 
9 See the art of Barbara Weir and Minnie Pwerle, available at www.pwerlegallery.com.au (last accessed 10th 
December 2018) 
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my foremothers in Australia, from England, Italy, France and Finland. My white-settler-
colonial history of Australian migration, constructing the settler-migrant state, disrupts the 
telling of indigenous knowledges and resettles as mainstream accounts of belonging and 
citizenship, displacing indigenous histories and actively frustrating indigenous citizenship 
and accounts of subjectivity.10 My awareness of the violent displacement of indigenous 
people and knowledge from the land which they belong to frames the feminist methodologies 
written into this article. As such, I wish to unsettle the very sense of knowing – of perception 
– of knowledge – that feminist jurisprudence takes for granted. I focus on indigenous 
Australian accounts because it is the displacement of this knowledge that constructs the 
conditions for my speaking and, thus, to take serious a claim to politically responsible 
listening, as I write below, I listen to indigenous Australian voices as a means to actively 
silence my own imagined utopias, spoken and unspoken. The use of Pwerle’s artwork 
provides a useful visual stimulus of the unreadability of indigenous knowledge practices in 
contemporary Australia; a fact quite obvious in art and images yet less easy to ‘read’ and 
‘see’ or listen to in epistemologies of law. 
I regard the turn to learn from indigenous Australia as relevant to a revisiting of Lacey’s 
Unspeakable Subjects because of the unspeakability of indigeneity in mainstream feminist 
jurisprudence, incorporating a general failure to recognise how law constructs ‘modes of 
subjectivity that render indigenous and colonized populations as outside history, lacking the 
requisite cultural practices, habits of thought, and economic organization to be considered as 
sovereign, rational economic subject’.11 This points to a persistent cleave in gender law 
reform such that despite critique and reform, the ‘utopias’ of feminist jurisprudence are yet to 
actively incorporate or listen to indigenous feminisms. As an Australian citizen, this has a 
deeply personal resonance although the attention paid to indigenous Australian knowledge is 
intended to be illustrative of the many knowledge frameworks displaced globally in favour of 
European enlightenment frames that fail to announce their own particular origins. As such, 
the article also asks of the reader a reflecting on whose silencing your own capacity to speak, 
to write, to read, to exist, depend upon.12 This continues the critical feminist project of Lacey 
in two distinct ways.13 First, Lacey acknowledges the necessity of feminist jurisprudence that 
works with legal and social theories in a critical vein; at once incorporating a foundational 
intersectionality drawn from critical race feminism while also offering an early account of 
                                                 
10 Allie McDowall and Fabiane Ramos, 'Doing Decoloniality in the Writing Borderlands of the PhD' (2018) 47 
(1) Special Issue on South-South Dialogues: Global Approaches to Decolonial Pedagogies Australian Journal of 
Indigenous Education 54; also see: Sujith Xavier, ‘Loving, Working and Living on Stolen Land: People of 
Colour, Settler Colonialism and White Supremacy’ December 8th, 2018, Reconciliation Syllabus, available 
online at: https://reconciliationsyllabus.wordpress.com/2018/12/08/loving-working-and-living-on-stolen-land-
people-of-colour-settler-colonialism-white-supremacy/ (last accessed 10th December 2018) 
11 Brenna Bhandar, Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land and Racial Regimes of Ownership (Duke University 
Press, 2018) 3 
12 However this is not a call for ‘Oppression Olympics’, see further: Xavier (n 10); Patricia Williams, ‘Spirit 
Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism (1987) 42 
University of Miami Law Review 127; Andrea Minear, ‘ “Unspeakable” Offenses: Disability Studies and the 
Intersection of Multiple Differences’ in Nirmala Erevelles, Disability and Difference in Global Contexts: 
Enabling a Transformative Body Politic (Palgrave MacMillan 2011)  
13 On critical feminist and legal projects, see; Lacey (n 1) 168, describing critical projects as ‘which are 
specifically concerned to go beyond the superficial appearance of legal practices and discourses, and to 
question, unsettle, expose to careful scrutiny not only current laws and their organisation but also the claims to 
authority and legitimacy which legal officials, law-makers, legal practices and theories implicitly express’; also 
see note 3. 
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future feminist critiques of mainstream US feminist legal theories.14 Second, despite her 
detailed theorisation of the fluidity and instability of gender as an organising principle Lacey 
reminds her readers of the persistence of gender – the real world effects and harms that are 
experienced as gendered.15 As such, a feminist jurisprudence that fails to search out the real 
world gendered harms and that fails to listen to those that suffer from the most deleterious 
effects of gender violence is only minimally feminist, if at all feminist. This is because 
feminism is intersectional and feminism is not a saving project, feminism is a knowledge 
project, an epistemology and an ontology (or, in the words of Jackson and Lacey, an 
interpretative account).16 
Pwerle’s art demonstrates this displacement of indigenous knowledge in settler-colonial 
Australia. Pwerle’s oeuvre contains large artworks themed around Awleye. Although I grew 
up in Australia, in second and third generation migrant families, I am not given the 
knowledge to decipher this word, or its meaning, or to read Pwerle’s images (even with an 
undergraduate degree in Art History!). As such, unlike migrant experiences in Britain that are 
often expected to assimilate to the dominant British culture, in Australia cultural signifiers 
that travelled with white migrants as settler colonialism have ignored, destroyed, and 
displaced indigenous knowledge. I therefore had to learn, as late as 2018, that Awelye refers 
to women’s ceremonies and body paint, which are deeply connected to the understanding of 
territory and sovereignty: 
The women paint each other's breasts and upper bodies with ochre markings, before 
dancing in a ceremony. The body designs are important and, painted on chest and 
shoulders, they relate to each particular woman's dreaming. The ochre pigment is 
ground into powder form and mixed with charcoal and ash before being applied with a 
flat padded stick or with fingers in raw linear and curving patterns. The circles in these 
designs represent the sites and movement where the ceremonies take place.17 
This is not knowledge understood by white/migrant Australians as it is cast within 
contemporary Australian culture as the language and meanings of the Other. Pwerle’s work 
therefore articulates both my alienation from indigenous Australia (an alienation which is 
normalised) and the alienation of indigenous women from voicing the contours of Australian 
histories and what counts as Australian knowledge. The necessity of silencing this history is 
interwoven into the violent colonial history that white settler Australia either has not told 
and/or actively renders invisible. Australia’s colonial history, instead, is replayed in images 
of white men flying the British flag as the First Fleet arrives at Botany Bay in 1788 and with 
indigenous Australians as insignificant as the fauna in the image.18 White and migrant 
Australia tells the story of the First Fleet until it is ingrained in the mythology of the nation, 
                                                 
14 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir and Chantal Thomas, ‘From the International to the Local in 
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/ Sex work and Sex Trafficking: Four Cases Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Governance 335 
15 Lacey (n 1) 14 
16 Emily Jackson and Nicola Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theories’ in James Penner, David Schiff and Richard 
Nobles (eds), Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: Commentary and Materials (Oxford, 2002)  
17 Kate Owen, Charmaine Pwerle, Pwerle Gallery available online at <http://www.pwerle.com.au/charmaine-
pwerle/ (accessed May 2018) 
18 Algernon Talmage Sydney Cove, Jan. 26th 1788 1937 oil sketch  
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displacing again and again any knowledge of indigenous Australia before the First Fleet and 
after.  
The displacement of indigenous knowledge, language and histories in the articulation of 
Australian legal subjectivity was achieved through genocide, a history not spoken within 
white Australia, or rather what perhaps should be re-described as white and migrant 
Australia. Law remains silent on the genocide of indigenous Australia, indigenous accounts 
of subjectivity and indigenous feminisms such that Watson concludes: 
I would say there is nothing or very little of the colonisers 'law' that we would seek to 
incorporate into Indigenous law. The question remains to be answered, how far is the 
state prepared to go, in peeling away the layers of the imposed colonial legal system? 
Are they prepared to undress themselves, and in their alien nakedness surrender to the 
law of the land?19 
 A politically responsible listening prioritises this knowledge to understand my own 
complicity in the perpetuation of a legal model that constructs its others again and again as a 
means to sustain privilege, gendered and otherwise. The displacement, going forward, needs 
to occur within dominant legal accounts and includes gender law reform that does not, at its 
core, theorise difference as integral to accounts of subjectivity. I return to indigenous 
accounts of subjectivity at the end of the article, along the way I use Lacey’s work to think 
differently about law’s subject/s and to prioritise an approach to feminist jurisprudence that 
acknowledges gender as one aspect of power and privilege that intersects with, and must be 
read through, adjunct critical accounts to build utopias and to imagine pathways to reform.       
II.                                 
Split Subjects 
 . . . [the] project is to contribute to feminism which recognises the problematic status of 
the category “woman” without making her disappear: which engages with the feminine 
as a construct, yet as a construct which has enormous social power.20 
Lacey regards critique as the method of ‘scrutinis[ing] the discourses or practices in question 
in terms of their own realisation of the values by which they profess to be informed.’21 In this 
section, I use Lacey’s ideas on the relevance of critique to think through the limitations of 
legal subjectivity. My thesis is that the motif of the split subject, rather than the 
unencumbered, rational subject, might better reflect human subjectivity and entrench an 
inclusive legal model at law’s foundation – while drawing feminist jurisprudence to search 
out knowledge formations outside of the Western legal and political traditions usually 
assumed as the framework for critique. My approach stems from a dissatisfaction with gender 
law reforms that reify the structures of law and legal arrangements and often reproduce 
intersectional harms. I argue that the embedded and assumed understanding of subjectivity 
within law, which derives from the masculine history of law, might be critiqued to shift from 
the status quo. To this end, I argue for a shift from a legal account of unencumbered to split 
subjects and I use the split subject as a mechanism to illustrate the poverty of existing 
                                                 
19 Watson (n 7) 58 
20 Lacey (n 1) 14 
21 Lacey (n 1) 231 
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assumptions with regard to legal subjectivity because all humans experience connection and 
separation in the formation of the self. My goal is to commence a search, in feminist 
jurisprudence, to find a language to challenge and critique the male histories of subjectivity.  
I am interested in how the bridge between lived experiences of the self might inform a 
nuanced account of the legal subject able to address feminist challenges to existing legal 
accounts of subjectivity.22 In this part of the article, inspired by Lacey’s perpetual cycle of 
critique-utopia-reform I argue for the legal subject as one informed by the experience of 
be(com)ing human rather than the tiresome and misrepresentative individualised, 
unencumbered and rational subject of liberalism.  
To conceive of legal subjectivity as split I was inspired by the thinking of Kristeva, 
articulated in the context of her reflections on the emergence of a second generation of 
women’s movements in Europe that had occurred by 1981.23 Kristeva considers the divide 
between feminist co-optation into state or socialist projects and, what she labels, an ‘avant-
garde feminism’ that is focused on female utopias. The former (early forms of governance 
feminism within European state structures) Kristeva challenges for the co-optation into non-
feminist structures that Kristeva considers ultimately re-appropriating feminist messages for 
their own ends. Within ‘avant-garde’ feminisms Kristeva is critical of their dependence on 
the category woman. Kristeva, then questions whether having started with the idea of 
difference, feminism will be able to break free of ‘its belief in Woman, Her power, Her 
writing, so as to channel this demand for difference into each and every element . . .’.24 For 
Kristeva addressing feminisms ‘belief in Woman’ is linked directly to the linear temporality 
of both modernity and the nation. Kristeva works to articulate a feminist account that is not 
limited to gendered accounts of the political domain, which she frames through the notion of 
split subjects mirroring the moment of human birth. In centring the human fact of the subject 
splitting for birth, as a legal motif, I am interested in how this might ground a non-gendered 
conception of humanness within law – where both autonomy and dependencies are able to be 
recognised. This would be a precondition to rethinking the knowledge foundations that 
inform both legal and feminist theories.  
Kristeva notes that ‘pregnancy seems to be experienced as the radical ordeal of splitting the 
subject’.25 As a comment drawn after an analysis of Freud’s construction of the female 
subject as one of lack, or envy, Kristeva proposes a model for imagining a de-gendered 
subject, where the split subject is the radical moment rather than the sexed body. That is, it is 
the moment of being born, not the gendering, that propels the legal subject into existence. 
This aligns with scholars, such as Scott; who, in her account of the legacy of thinking on sex 
difference, considers the need for feminist scholarship ‘to simultaneously insist on and refuse 
the identity of “women”’.26 Lacey articulates a similar position in her analysis of the work of 
both Irigaray and Cornell, concluding:  
                                                 
22 Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (Law Book Company 1997) 
23 Julie Kristeva, trans. Alice Jardine and Harry Blake, ‘Women’s Time’ (1981) 7 Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 13 (hereafter ‘Women’s Time’); Julie Kristeva, ‘Motherhood According to Giovanni 
Bellini’ in Leon S Roudiez (ed), Desire in Language (Columbia University Press 1980) 237, 238 
24 Kristeva ‘Women’s Time’ (n 23) 33 
25 Kristeva ‘Women’s Time’ (n 23) 31 
26 Scott (n 4) 10 
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Much work, practical and theoretical, analytical and imaginative, needs to be done if 
the notions of neutrality, rights, equality and justice are to be understood in their 
racially, sexually and otherwise oppressive reality and if they are to be reconstructed in 
a way which promises the genuine accommodation of different forms of life, different 
subjectivities.27 
Kristeva’s split subject at once acknowledges the incompatibly of the masculine legal subject 
as a universal, while simultaneously rejecting the feminine, or female experience, as 
substitute or alternative. Central to this is an understanding of the exclusions feminine 
universals have carried into feminist scholarship, resulting in the amenability of feminist 
scholarship to very limited gender law reform agendas while alienating and undermining 
women from outside of elite women and Western women’s experiences of gendered lives. As 
such, a split subjectivity incorporates a motif of humanness where to be human is to be born 
into difference.28 The central pivot being the knowledge that all human subjects originate via 
the splitting from another subject in a manner that is both one of connection and separateness, 
that can read difference and dependencies simultaneously, and without gendering. 
The split subject can hold the knowledge that ‘the relationship posited between male and 
female, masculine and feminine, is not predictable; we cannot assume that we know in 
advance what it is’.29 As such, the split subject need not be fixed to dominant gender 
arrangements through recognising gender as a power relationship that, in coordination with 
other power structures, enacts on, shapes, and is shaped by, subjects.  For Kristeva, the split 
subject is linked to understanding of the ‘subject in process/in question/on trial’.30  
To bring this knowledge to legal understandings of subjectivity allows the conceptualisation 
of legal subjectivity to commence with difference, fluidity, and the capacity for multiple 
subjectivities as the starting point rather than the deviation: it this which I consider an 
important feminist critique. Placing the split subject into legal accounts allows thus (in legal 
reforms) for recognition of both relationality and autonomy of actors. The importance of this 
is immediately obvious in, say, crimes of domestic violence. The law’s encounter with 
relationship violence requires knowledge of both the ongoing relationships between the 
parties and – even at the moment of splitting – of the autonomy of the parties, whether 
perpetrator, victim/survivor, parent, child, partner, extended family member, or any 
combination of these identities. As law stands, in cases of relationship violence, the 
perpetrator is often given too much autonomy (e.g. in framing the narrative)31 while the 
victim/survivor is often punished for the continued desire and recognition of the relational 
(e.g dropping charges, choosing to return to the relationship). In Manitoba, Canada, it was the 
creation of courtroom processes that not only saw and valued the relationship but centred the 
relationship between the parties and the parties and the court to transform outcomes in 
Domestic Violence Courts.32 Similarly, Elizabeth’s account of custody stalking in UK cases 
                                                 
27 Lacey (n 1) 217 
28 Also see: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd edn, Chicago 1998) 9  
 
29 Scott (n 4) 11 
30 Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’ (n 23) 31 
31 Liz Kelly and Nicola Westmarland, (2016) 'Naming and Defining 'Domestic Violence': lessons from research 
with violent men’ (2016) 112 Feminist Review 113 
32 Jane Ursel, 'The Possibilities of Criminal Justice Intervention in Domestic Violence: A Canadian Case study' 
(1996-7) 8 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 263  
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of relationship violence affirms, ‘fathers who pursue care time with their children are likely 
to be viewed as moral agents and to receive applause for their actions, regardless of their 
histories of violence and/or control’.33 In these situations the past experiences of violence and 
coercive control are dismissed as unimportant to the ongoing network of gendered relations, 
while the male desire for access is ‘read’ as the appropriate actions of the unencumbered, 
rational subject that override the survivor’s accounts of prior violence and control. The 
gendering of both relationships and rationality thus undoes the capacity of the court to value 
alternative accounts. The recognition of a split subject might not undo these gendered 
framings, but it should give pause for rethinking who is rendered rational and full legal 
subjects informing the narrative to be accepted in court and whose narrative is discounted as 
relational and thus emotional. The split subject encounters humans as both connected and 
separate, bridging the self and the legal subject in important ways that undoes the gendered 
expectations of law and legal relations.34  
Nevertheless, it is important to anchor the discussion of the split subject with that which it is 
not intended to be. This is not an ethics of care politics centred on using women’s difference 
or feminine forms as the normative foundation for a new (or old!) legal model. Nor is this 
built around the body that is primarily sexed female. Neither is the split subject constructed as 
an approach aimed at giving the ultimate answer to conceptions of legal subjectivity: this 
would negate the attention to feminist method attested to earlier which specifically rejects the 
notion of ‘grand theories’ supplying complete ‘answers’ to complex legal and political 
projects.35 The split subject is drawn from, not from a universal feminine form, rather, the 
knowledge that all humans emerge from a splitting from the pregnant body. This is reflective 
of an approach where feminist messages are attentive to the complexity and the diversity of 
the subject’s experiences of the world. 36 The pregnant body is used as a symbol for the 
reality of human subjectivity as intimately and originally concerned with a breaking away, a 
separation, and natal potential, rather than an entering of the world as a fully formed and 
unified subject. This occurs for individuals, whether through the process of being born, or 
through the growth from childhood to adult that requires variations in dependence on central 
carers, as well as for states (also legal subjects) which require some form of separation from 
previous arrangements and independence from previous community structures to assert 
sovereignty.37                                                                                                    
For Otomo, the call for a new vocabulary in approaching law is developed as an argument 
against the development of strategies of compliance that fail to engage in revolutionary 
feminist practices (and thus akin to Kristeva’s critique, above). Otomo counsels:  
                                                 
33 Vivienne Elizabeth, ‘Custody Stalling: A Mechanism of Coercively Controlling Mothers Following 
Separation’ (2017) 25 Feminist Legal Studies 185, 189 
34 Here I draw on a distinction between the self, as how identity is understood by the individual and subjects (in 
this case legal subjects) ‘defined by others outside oneself’, see: Robert Hill, ‘Surviving Domestic Violence and 
Navigating the Academy: An Autoethnography’ (2018) 4 (1) Journal of Critical Scholarship on Higher 
Education and Student Affairs 27, 33 
35 Lacey (n 1) 171, 176 - 178 
36 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law’ in Sari Kouvo and 
Zoe Pearson (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and 
Compliance? (Hart 2011) 17; Isabelle Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perception, World Travelling and Multicultural 
Feminism’ (1992) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 189 
37 For a longer discussion, see: Gina Heathcote, Feminist Dialogues on International Law: successes, tensions, 
futures (Oxford University Press 2019) 
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The answer . . . is to hold on to both resistance and revolution as feminist telos, but to 
distinguish in our minds between the institutional structures . . . (which we must 
continue to engage with and resist in order to achieve our political goals), and the space 
created by failures of masculinist . . . discourse which we can fill with revolutionary 
readings, writings, speaking and beings.38 
Drawing inspiration from Otomo’s twofold project, I consider the split subject as conceptual 
apparatus to fill the space created by the poverty of masculinist state discourse. Otomo thus 
finds ‘[w]e may, for example, remain within a maternal metaphor, but rather than writing it 
into the sacrificial fraternal economy, hold onto the more nuanced (parasitic, symbiotic, 
combative) relations between mother and child when thinking about regulation of such 
relations’.39 Similarly, I am not advocating the transference from a masculinist conception of 
law to a feminine conception of law – rather I propose a project of seeing the diversity of 
bodies and personhood because the split subject, or the pregnant body, is understood as 
difference, as potentiality, as the natal moment which connects what it means to be human 
(rather than female or male).40 Ultimately the split subject is a critique of existing 
conceptions of law that fail to incorporate the relational within legal relationships, asking 
why masculinist perceptions of legal subjectivity persist within legal framings. By 
acknowledging human experience as defined by the splitting from the pregnant body not only 
is the relational nature of subjectivity embedded as creating the conditions for autonomy of 
the subject, human difference is constituted as that which makes us the same so that gender of 
the subject is no longer embedded in law.41 This, I argue, is not only a critique of relevance 
for feminist jurisprudence but equally a tool that might illuminate reform strategies that look 
towards (in the words of Lacey) new horizons/utopias where the embedding of difference, 
relationality and autonomy function to redesign feminist epistemologies that are inclusive of 
new and varied meanings of subjectivity. The split subject might even accommodation 
accounts of subjectivity that include the connection to earth, to land, to non-human animals – 
an approach to subjectivity that is central to indigenous Australian accounts of law and land; 
where recognition of the human-earth dependency is as central as human-human 
dependencies.  
Plural Subjects  
 . . . though feminism must (and does by definition) start out from the assumption that 
sex/gender has a general significance across a range of social fields, it must maintain an 
open mind on the interaction between sex/gender and other important axes of social 
differentiation (and oppression) such as race, socio-economic class, age, sexual 
orientation . . . 42 
Lacey’s analysis of utopian/utopia in feminist theories analyses approaches that insist ‘that 
we can imagine the world differently’ acknowledging this as an important corrective to the 
political inertia sometimes encountered in critical projects.43 For Lacey this addresses the 
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impasse found within post-structuralist accounts that ‘engage in the impossible project of 
speaking that which, according to their own analysis, cannot be spoken’.44 I am interested in 
the impossibility of difference for feminist legal theories. Given the attachment to women as 
the subject of gender law reform, in this section I consider what it means to think past the 
subject of women and to imagine difference as the organising methodology for feminist legal 
theories. This supplements the critique of subjectivity, above, and wonders about the capacity 
for feminist legal theories to re-imagine the very categories and structures that inform legal 
discourse, to: 
 . . . resist the idea of a complete or overarching feminist theory, which seems to me to 
encounter the intellectual objection that is inevitably suggests a certain political or 
empirical priority for sex/gender . . .45 
In this part of the article, I wish to move beyond the discussion of split subjects to think about 
what that means in terms of reforming feminist praxis. If the split subject is the epistemology, 
the plural subject, which I discuss here, is the method and, perhaps, politically responsible 
listening, which I discuss in the next part, the utopia as it imagines a world of self-reflexive 
feminisms framed around kindness and care, remembering and listening. To develop a 
method of plural subjectivities – presupposed by the epistemology of split subjects – I draw 
on the scholarship of Kapur; in particular her account of peripheral subjects. In the work of 
Kapur, via the articulation of the peripheral subject as a normative starting point for feminist 
theorising, a robust critique of feminist approaches to international human rights law, and 
violence against women strategies within law, is presented.46 Kapur’s approach hinges on 
acknowledging the victim subject of liberal-radical feminist approaches to human rights so as 
to ask how feminism constructs its subject/s and thus its theories of knowing.47 The 
peripheral subject recognises non-dominant legal forms as relevant to the rendering of legal 
reform, in other words, potentially promoting a shift toward legal pluralism through the 
disposing of dominant thought and knowledge paradigms that underscore legal processes. My 
argument is this can be expanded to build a mode of plural subjects, entrenching difference in 
conceptions of subjectivity. The peripheral subject also acknowledges the perspective, agency 
and voice – as a normative force – outside of the masculine, Western unencumbered subject 
imagined in liberal projects and often reproduced within gender law reform. When this 
universal is dislodged from its invisible place in the formation of knowledge, what sits 
behind? To avoid a substitute of one particular parading as a universal with a new particular 
parading as a new universal the plural subjects foreground difference as an organising 
principle that both challenges the persistence of civilising projects and redesigns legal 
relationships through the expectation of encountering difference. 
Kapur demonstrates how contemporary approaches to challenging violence against women 
under international human rights law constructs a non-Western subject in need of ‘saving’ 
and elite women within political arenas as ‘agents’ (best placed to undertake the job of 
saving). Theagent-victim binary discounts the capacity of those cast as victim to articulate 
feminist legal approaches, or solutions, given the necessity that they be saved by those who 
already have full capacity to articulate normative structures. Kapur challenges feminists to 
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attend to the normative agenda of peripheral subjects as a mechanism for disrupting the 
victim-agent binary.48 Through highlighting Kapur’s work, the peripheral subject emerges as 
a mechanism for engaging political consciousness in the foundations of law through attention 
to inequalities and their gendered intersections. That is, the peripheral subject asks difficult 
(and different) questions with regard to whose interests are represented in gender law reform 
and, given her location outside of dominant power structures and knowledge producing 
spaces, is a reminder to articulate gender as embedded in racialised, heteronormative and 
colonial histories. Gender law reform might look very different if this were the normative 
starting point, informing feminist methodologies within law: the knowledge and perspective 
of indigenous Australians, for example, is recognised as of equal value to mainstream 
Australia.  
In order not to construct a new particular that is parading as a universal, I want to suggest the 
peripheral subject must be placed in dialogue with others, for example, Braidotti’s nomadic 
subject or Brah’s diasporic subjects. I am interested in what happens if Kapur’s peripheral 
subject is placed in dialogue with Braidotti’s nomadic subject or Brah’s accounts of the 
diasporic subject.49 The nomadic subject enters Braidotti’s work as a cross boundary, 
stateless post-human whose subjectivity ‘reflects the existential situation of the multicultural 
individual, a migrant who turned nomad’.50 At the core of Braidotti’s project is a commitment 
to ‘re-thinking the bodily roots of subjectivity’ that acknowledges both the diversity of lived 
bodily experiences and the epistemological projection of identity onto bodies in a manner that 
‘Others’ specific subjects. Braidotti’s account is then able to engage directly with the 
construction of subjectivity both through and within identity politics, across differentiations, 
to release understandings of subjectivity into the ranging, temporally shifting and 
geographically mobile subjectivity of the nomad. Braidotti’s work centres on the individual 
subject within philosophical work, transferring and re-imagining this within the context of 
law might be deployed to disrupt a return to understanding the sexed and gendered subject is 
prefigured in our understanding of legal subjects, especially when the nomad is placed in 
dialogue with the peripheral subject.51 Braidotti’s project is akin to Kapur’s focus on 
subjectivity, although where Kapur draws on postcolonial subjects to frame a subject of 
resistance to the imperial legacy of legal endeavours, Braidotti uses an account of 
postmodernism (as the contemporary temporal account rather than an ahistorical theory) and 
psychoanalytical accounts to explore the role of the affective and the role of desire in the 
formation of subjectivity. The persistence of difference as a marker of inequality so that, in 
the words of Braidotti, ‘the nomadism in question here refers to the kind of critical 
consciousness that resists settling into socially coded thoughts and behaviours’ can be 
developed as a normative project that challenges key assumptions that inform legal 
thinking.52 Braidotti imagines a version of subjectivity that considerably transcends 
philosophical traditions that assumed the male body and experience of powerful men as the 
archetype of the human condition. Consequently, if feminist engagements with law seek to 
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move beyond the dominant spaces of gender law reform that have emerged thus far and, 
accepting that these law reforms tend to reproduce gendered bodies and sexed subjects, a 
fluid and dynamic account of subjectivity is necessary. If a fluid and dynamic account of 
subjectivity centres plural subjects as motif, then the nomad, the peripheral or diasporic 
subjects need not individually stand as the fixed account, but rather feminist epistemologies 
can be constructed around spaces of dialogue between and with plural subjects. Varied 
dimensions and experiences of difference, and Othering, are thus called in to inform legal 
foundations, whether the sex worker, or the migrant, or the widow.  
To Braidotti’s and Kapur’s projects, centred on subjectivity, Brah’s work on diaspora furthers 
our understanding of the failure of categories of belonging within dominant philosophical-
political accounts. The closure of identity politics and limited perspective offered when 
mapping the world through the national state (or nationalism) destroys significant 
appreciation of the migrant’s multi-located sense of belonging and the capacity for human 
empathy, memory and difference to be the site of our sense of belonging. Like Braidotti and 
Kapur, Brah’s account commences a project of acknowledging fractured subjectivity that has 
resonance for understanding subjectivity before law. But, rather than seeking a means to 
understand fragmented subjectivities within an (assumed) hermeneutically sealed world of 
legal relationships, rules and principles, Brah’s work asks us to consider subjectivity as the 
space to know and understand the ‘Other’. Furthermore, Brah’s critical contributions remind 
feminist methodologies that their messages need not look to the global south to ‘find’ 
gendered harm and discrimination, and that intersectional harm configures and produces all 
spaces, even those Westerners imagine as home. Brah’s articulation of the migrant, in 
dialogue with peripheral and nomadic subjects, indicates feminist starting points must be 
plural subjectivities: that continually open out their invitation to those who are to speak and 
placing the conceptualisation of subjectivity in flux, as she crosses borders and belongs, finds 
home, here and there, there and here.  
Kapur, Braidotti and Brah all present challenges to the feminist and the legal philosopher 
alike – they demand a re-assessment of the types of engagements, both practical and 
substantive, that have evolved and emerged in feminist legal theories since the early 1990s. 
The expectation that legal arrangements might embrace contemporary gender theorists’ 
formation and engagements with multiple, wandering subjectivities in the first few waves of 
feminist approaches to law is unrealistic. The types of feminist developments within law have 
instead mirrored the types of larger development within the discipline of law itself. The 
consequence has been a re-assertion and acceptance of the sexed and gendered foundations of 
law and increased critique of the victim and governance feminisms that have emerged in 
political and legal reforms. To shift beyond this, I argue, a broader and more complex 
feminist encounter within law is required. Thus, attention to how knowledge is able to 
traverse legal structures, in a nomadic fashion, with attention to (assumed) peripheral 
accounts of legal arrangements as normatively equivalent to the core is required. This also 
produces a central questioning of any sense of belonging, or home, that is derived from a 
nationalist politics and deprived of the multi-consciousness of the migrant.  
As such, through drawing feminist writing on plural subjectivities into a feminist legal 
project, complexity, fluidity, choice and relationality are demonstrated as elements of human 
experience that are poorly reflected in legal structures. Acknowledging the perspectives of 
peripheral, nomadic and diasporic subjects as normative, drives recognition that there is, and 
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must be, an explicit engagement with ethical commitments knitted within feminist legal 
projects. The dominant unspoken ethical commitment to feminist legal advances – where the 
non-Western / migrant / poor woman is constructed and reconstructed as damaged, in need of 
protection, without voice and cast as an actor defined through her assumed feminine body – is 
in this approach re-assigned a problematic gender ethic. Peripheral, nomadic and diasporic 
voices instead challenge the binary of m>f as the central / single organising force in critical 
feminist accounts and in law. Consequently, feminist projects within law must actively work 
to disrupt this sense of knowing, or assumed gender politics, to use and develop plural 
understandings as a mechanism to intervene and disrupt precisely what we think law should 
be. It is in stories of plurality that the knowledge to disrupt the intersecting power relations is 
made visible and the peripheral, the nomadic and the diasporic subject might begin 
conversations that are transformative of the normative order and its underpinnings.  
My final thought on plural subjects returns to Lacey and traces her response to difference and 
its pivotal placement in feminist jurisprudence to acknowledge Lacey’s identification of the 
continued tension between diversity as cornerstone of feminist methodologies and the 
potentially destabilising effect of events to draw diversity into legal processes. Lacey 
identifies that ‘diversity and fragmentation of social experience’ functions to construct the 
need for feminist jurisprudence to ‘listen to the insights of women in a variety of locations 
relative to the many powerful sites of oppression – class, race, sexuality’.53 At the same time, 
Lacey recognises ‘the spectre of total fragmentation seems to threaten feminisms mission to 
speak in the voice of political outrage or advocacy’.54 To address this, I have tried to avoid 
falling into the articulation of a grand theory but to rather interrogate law’s self-perception 
and to conceive of ways to imagine that perception differently – and with difference as an 
organising principle. The split and plural subject thus function to re-imagine law as designed 
around the unifying aspects of human experience, to be born, to be different. Least my 
approach entering into the abstraction of masculinist accounts of justice and law,55 in the 
following section I shift to the very practical, and yet little practiced, art of listening – with 
political responsibility.  
Speaking Subjects  
It assumes that a single individual can “get inside” the experience of others, imagine 
what their lives might be, without ever having to listen to anyone else.56 
In this quote from Unspeakable Subjects, Lacey analyses liberal political theorist Rawls’ 
construction of the original position as a device for understanding justice. Lacey’s analysis 
not only interrogates the assumed role of disembodied and degendered subjects who people 
the original position, but further asks how a project of political justice can proceed without 
listening to the situated understanding of the Other.  I want to return to this idea of listening 
in this section, further complicating the split and plural subject to move beyond abstraction, 
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critique or utopias and to propose listening as a prelude to gender law reform. I expand 
Lacey’s articulation of the situated speaking subject through a review of the work of Otto.57 
Lacey analyses the impact of gender law reforms to find ‘the institutions which reformist 
interventions seek to change are themselves interwoven with and dependent upon a complex 
network of other institutions’.58 The reality of this has been demonstrated in the variety of 
gender reforms seen in law in the twenty years after the publication of Unspeakable Subjects, 
whether focused on rights and empowerment or laws that criminalise gender-based violence. 
I am particularly interested in how the spectrum of gender law reforms within law have to 
often enshrined sex difference, and legal responses to the assumed priority of sex difference, 
as the organising principle of gender law reform.59 That is, at the centre of gender law reform 
lies a gendered binary that reinforces and revolves around the categories of men and women, 
with an assumed heteronormative relation and that tends to essentialise gender categories 
rather than transcend them. For feminist legal theorists, balancing the need for legal clarity 
within intersectional feminist methodologies is not straightforward, even if plural and split 
subjects might, at a deep level, help re-frame our understandings of legal subjectivity: in 
other words, law requires categories of inclusion while intersectionality requires nuanced 
understanding of the overlapping of categories of exclusion.  
In this part of the article, to understand how gender operates in any specific legal context, 
how gender interlocks with other sites of privilege, and the best means to see the gender 
norms of institutions I argue for politically responsible listening. This is a conscious shift 
from a feminist methodology theorising difference that, in contrast, pivots around the 
experience/expertise of white, western and/or elite women in a given political context. As 
such, the third approach to intersectionality, which I wish to add to the theorising of plural 
and split subjectivity above, incorporates Otto’s articulation of listening in feminist 
jurisprudence. Otto’s analysis is drawn from an analysis of people’s tribunals which she 
describes as while functioning ‘imitate the legal form of a court, they seek to perform the 
power of law, but in a way that gives voice to dissenting perspectives and to subjects whose 
experience has been silenced by law and mainstream politics’.60 In reflecting on her role as 
Expert Panelist at the Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing on Gender-Based Violence in 
Conflict, held 10-11 October 2012, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and as member of the Judicial 
Council for the Women’s Court–Feminist Approach to Justice, which was held 7-10 May 
2015, in Sarajevo (Sarajevo Tribunal), Otto records: 
I have realised more fully the limits of conceiving responsibility only in terms of 
perpetrators—whether individuals, states, or non-state actors like militias and 
multinational corporations. Justice also requires challenging the structures of economic 
and military power, which institutionalise impunity in a larger sense. The means of 
challenging structural injustice lie largely outside the law, in the politics of the 
everyday, for which we all share some responsibility.61 
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Otto thus draws into focus both the macro and micro dimensions of gendered encounters, 
identifying the nexus between conflict-related sexual violence (the focus of the Tribunals) 
and larger transnational political arrangements and the nexus with the everyday, gendered 
operations of human lives. Situating herself as complicit, Otto articulates a role for politically 
responsible listening to re-align the assumed knowledge and sites of knowledge in justice 
project. 
Otto’s description of politically responsible listening as active listening and hearing what the 
meaning of gender is, how gender harm emerges, and is sustained, and how legal institutions 
bring gendered assumptions into gender law reform is an excellent companion to Kapur’s 
challenge to take seriously the normative commitments, the knowledge production and the 
views of those that are most affected by the changes feminism may wish to operationalise. 
This includes, by definition, an acceptance that changes might be asked of actors within 
academic and legal institutions that disrupts existing power and privilege, including for some 
women or feminists, is uncomfortable, and may even be silencing of these actors. For 
feminist legal theorists the project of working to actively bring the self into the ‘frame of 
responsibility’ draws in not only the positionality of the scholar but also the relationship 
between feminist and other sites of critical engagement with law through a forced recognition 
of gender’s intersectional nature. 
Otto writes of the role of experts at the hearings in Phnom Penh, noting the space between the 
acts of listening during the testimonies in the hearings and the contributions of experts. Otto 
concludes:  
Although the experts spoke with passion and commitment, there was very little 
resonance between what they had to say and the survivors’ testimonies of their 
quotidian struggles for survival in the present realities of post-conﬂict (in)justice. For 
me, it was an object lesson in how agendas, understood as universal, can not only fail to 
connect with the local, but can also dictate how the problem is presented and addressed 
at the local level.62 
For Otto part of the solution is to build practices that make clear the connection between 
listening and responsibility. This approach offers no simple reformation of feminist work on 
law as it is, at its heart, an understanding of the co-optation of feminist accounts of law into 
the continued production of specific types of legal interventions and a challenge to what 
feminist actors within legal spaces think they know. Consequently, there must be attention to 
where race, sexuality, class, ableism, and other forms of privilege integrate into feminist 
knowledge production to reinforce the status quo when transformed into institutional 
outcomes. As such, Otto’s politics of responsible listening asks for reflection on our own co-
optation, as feminist and legal scholars, in the legal formations that we position as sites for 
gender law reform. I regard this as a methodology well beyond the conventional means and 
mechanisms that we might listen to others through. That is, if feminist jurisprudence accepts 
the reality of plural subjects as speaking subjects, who will inform the normative contours of 
political and legal arrangements, then a politically responsible listening asks of about each 
feminist’s own complicity in the maintenance of the status quo where gendered power 
interacts and produces raced, classed and ableist power and privileges in a simultaneous and 
self-sustaining network of relations. This is a knowledge project. For me, personally, it is a 
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need for recognition of the dislodged voices of indigenous histories in the formation of the 
Australian state – where I was born – as having a normative force that should be central to the 
future of the legal relations in Australia. At what cost would listening to these articulations of 
human relations, of subjectivity, of belonging, and of being, be made? A politically 
responsible listening is a space of feminist law reform that begins with listening to this 
knowledge.  
III. 
Conclusions  
Lacey’s text Unspeakable Subjects has its prescience in the quest to centre feminism’s 
capacity to question and reshape the categories within legal writing and research.63 In this 
article I have centred legal subjectivity to articulate new methods of critique, utopia and 
reform to re-imagine a legal subject beyond sex difference, that is ungendered in a manner 
that permits engagement with difference within and throughout gendered lives. I have drawn 
on three interlocking methodologies to re-imagine legal accounts of subjectivity, inspired by 
Lacey’s process of critique, utopias and reform in feminist analysis.64 In drawing in 
Kristeva’s work an alternative to masculinist conceptions of legal subjectivity is articulated 
through the motif of split subjectivity.65 Likewise, through presenting the texts of Kapu, 
Braidotti and Brah in dialogue, an understanding of legal subjectivity via plural subjectivities 
is imagined.66 The plural subject is conceptualised through a dialogue on difference that is 
constructed to speak alongside and within the split subject framework. Following Lacey, I 
acknowledge law’s need for certainty and closure,67 and while recognising the unpredictable 
outcomes of legal reforms, I developed in the third account the writing of Otto on a feminist 
politics of listening.68  Finally, the images of Charmaine Pwerle demonstrate the un-
readability of forms of knowledge dislodged from conceptualising what it means to be human 
in dominant accounts which, I have argued, feminist legal theorists must learn to listen to, to 
read and to understand to avoid co-optation in legal projects and law reform that re-assert the 
status quo of gender relations and wider power structures. What then does it take to listen and 
understand, to incorporate into feminist critique, utopia and reform, indigenous 
understandings of law? 
The impact of terra nullius surrounds us: violations of our law, ecological destruction of 
our lands and waters, dispossession from our territories and the colonisation of our 
being. Terra nullius has not stopped; the violations of our law continue, the ecological 
destruction of the earth our mother continues with a vengeance, we are still struggling 
to return to the land, and the assimilator-integrator model is still being forced upon us. 
This is terra nullius in its practical and continuing application. There is no death of terra 
nullius.69 
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The split and plural subject, heard in indigenous scholarship, is also a subject connected 
and a part of the earth, indigenous law shifts feminist challenges to the individualised, 
rational legal subject and questions not only isolating of subjects from another but also the 
isolating of human subjects from non-human subjects. A project of politically responsible 
listening, following Otto, not only listens but reflects on the complicity we maintain in 
projects of environmental destruction and the perpetuation of colonial forms through law. 
The degendered subject, split and plural, is transformed further, re-imagined and questions 
asked of legal and political arrangements that destroy the environment that sustains us. 
This knowledge that indigenous accounts contribute to re-imagine legal subjectivity as one 
invested in relation to the earth / our environment requires more listening to make sense of 
this in a political era where this connection has been disentangled form human legal 
relations.  The displacement of indigenous knowledge in Australia was encapsulated in the 
dispute of the building of a bridge to Hindmarsh Island in 
 
The recent dispute over the building of a bridge to Kumarangk, illustrated the power of 
the state to intrude into the discussion and determination of our cultural and spiritual 
identity. But the dispute also illustrated the power of indigenous peoples to continue to 
echo the voices of the ancestors on law and culture. The women of Kumarangk said we 
are still the carriers of' women's law-business', and we still honour that after 200 years 
of colonialism. And the state said: you are lying.70 
 
In fact, in the inquiry into the building of the bridge no indigenous women were listened 
to: they chose not to speak due to the sacred nature of the knowledge required to be 
communicated. When questioning occurred of an indigenous elder, Watson records the 
following exchange: 
 
Q. So you cannot tell us, can you, in what way the bridge would affect the spirituality 
of the island, which is women's business, can you.  
A. No, I have no way in the world of explaining that to you. I never come here to talk 
about the women's business on that site.  
Q. You are not in a position to talk about it, are you.  
A. Because I can't, I'm a man.71 
 
Ultimately the truth of the existence of women’s business, women’s knowledge, became 
the question which the inquiry answered with a negative. That is, if this knowledge could 
not be spoken within the space of the inquiry it could not exist. This failure to listen, to 
bear responsibility for the history of silencing, rendering invisible and ignoring indigenous 
knowledge demonstrates the antithesis of Otto’s politically responsible listening.  
 
To conclude, in returning and re-reading Lacey’s Unspeakable Subjects,72 feminist legal 
theorists are reminded of the necessity for feminist legal methodologies that problematise 
foundation categories and orthodoxies within jurisprudence. In this article I have used this as 
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stimulus for engagement and reflection on a wide range of feminist possibilities. I have 
argued that through developing a feminist jurisprudence responding to the foundations of 
law, contemporary feminist legal theories are better able to commence dialogues that respond 
to contemporary (not necessarily legal) feminist writing on gender and race, subjectivity and 
silencing/listening.  
What then if we were to listen, to allow the split-subject to honour plural lives and world 
views, could feminist jurisprudence contemplate what it means to say: 
The law transcends all things, guiding us in the tradition of living a good life, that is, a 
life that is sustainable and one which enables our grand-children yet to be born to also 
experience a good life on earth. The law is who we are, we are also the law. We carry it 
in our lives. The law is everywhere, we breathe it, we eat it, we sing it, we live it. And 
it is, as explained by George Tinamin: Ngangatja apu wiya, ngayuku tjamu. This is not 
a rock, it is my grandfather. This is a place where the dreaming comes up, right up from 
inside the ground.73 
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